Cold War 2.0: Putin’s Reality

            The Soviet Union was disappearing, created by Joseph Stalin, the great empire was crumbling. For Vladimir Putin perestroika and glasnost was a disaster. Glasnost initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev was a policy leading the USSR to a more open form of government. Perestroika was the restructuring of the political and economic system bringing an end to centralized planning. Putin saw these policies not as opportunities as intended but the downfall of his proud and powerful Russia. In Putin’s view, the United States was taking advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union and through NATO on a course of military and political expansion towards the Russian borders. In Putin’s world, Russia counters the political and military weight of the United States.  By stopping the eastward expansion through countries on Russian borders, he provides Russia with a buffer zone between it and NATO’s European supporters. Putin’s objective is to stop the eastward expansion of NATO and protecting the Russian speaking people of not only Russia but its neighbors (Smith).

            Working with KGB since the age of 23, Putin was a combatant against U.S. during the Cold War. He saw firsthand the changes in Russian political stature occurring with the collapse of the USSR. He witnessed the apparent humiliation of the Russia at the hands of weak and ineffective leaders like Boris Yeltsin. The West celebrated the opening of Russia’s and its former satellites’ borders while Putin saw disorientation in his compatriots. There was no sense of liberation or cause for celebration for Putin. For Putin saw only loss and decline, in Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War it stated that “Tens of millions of ethnic Russians found themselves “abroad””. A territory larger than India lost with its resources and nearly half of the population. For Putin, this was the bitter taste of his Russia’s defeat, relinquished to a subordinate, a “regional power” as stated by Barack Obama.

            Putin’s strongman character developed in this environment. Taking control of the government and the media upon becoming president.  He begins using the media to create an image, an ideology to rally support from the people. The foundation for this ideology are nationalism, social conservatism, and xenophobia. (Evan Osnos) All three are part of the Russian political culture. These 3 characteristics and the strongman persona portrayed by carefully guided media provide the elements of control.

            To maintain control, red tape, and absent media coverage mute’s opposition leaders. Others become public examples like Mikhail Khodorkovsky once controlling Siberian oil fields and very wealthy was arrested, charged with fraud, and spent 9 years in prison while his assets became worthless through government action. All this occurred because Khodorkovsky funded an opposition leader. Other high profile individual or groups were targeted and subjected to similar treatment provides a clear message to would be dissenters.

            While Putin consolidated power and gains overwhelming support of his people, the U.S. has been pushing the NATO’s boundaries eastward inviting former Easter Block countries into participation. This process of expansion continued without much Russian dissent until 1995 when Operation Deliberate Force was executed to curtail the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conflict had created an enormous humanitarian crisis in Eastern Europe and there were indications that massacres of whole villages were taking place. For Putin and Russians in general, the military action by aircraft and ground forces of 15 nations of the United Nations Protection Force carried a vastly different meaning. It was a military activity too close to home, NATO was knocking at their doorstep, it was threatening.

The bombing in Bosnia was a pivotal event for Putin, it demonstrated how the UN and NATO could be used to put a military force on his border and regardless of the circumstances this was unacceptable.  Add to this, the non-violent “Color Revolutions” that were taking place in Balkan and Middle Eastern states and this military action takes on new meaning. Muammar Gaddafi, the Socialist leader of Libya was killed brutally after interventions by NATO aiding anti-Gaddafi rebels, for Putin, this was personal and another piece of the threat puzzle fell into place. The revolutions of the “Arab Spring” followed and these served to destabilize several governments in North Africa shifting power to new governments. These events taken together were beginning to paint a picture of western expansionism to Putin.  The last piece fell into place and it came from within Russia.

In 2013, the Russian chief of general staff published “The Value of Science of Prediction”. It stated how the use of “military, technological, media, political and intelligence tactics” could be used to “destabilize an enemy at minimal cost” (Evan Osnos).  It is this article, this last piece of the puzzle coming from his own general, that crystalized for Putin the threat posed by the U.S. and NATO. In this context, the new missile defense system the U.S. is pushing ever closer to Russian borders takes on a whole new level of threat.  Putin sees the U.S. practicing these modern tactics in various parts of the world. The U.S. has military bases  and ports around the world, Russia is surrounded, to Putin, he is backed into a corner. A dangerous place to be with a nuclear arsenal at his command.

The threat is real, for Putin, for the U.S., and the rest of the world. The U.S. does not appear to have a deliberate coherent strategy to destabilize Russia. There lies the problem, an incoherent strategy applying political pressure and military intervention randomly may have the consequence of appearing like a threat to former enemy, reinforcing old prejudices and beliefs. It is well documented that people may perceive patterns where patterns do not exist. Only by applying intelligence and coherency to U.S. international policy will a definitive non-threatening pattern appear. The U.S. needs to find a way for Putin not to feel like his back is to the wall. Leadership and communication in an inclusive participatory new world order is needed to render our nuclear stockpiles of destruction obsolete.

Works Cited

Crowley, Michael. Politico: Senior Foreign Affairs Correspondent PBS: Fresh Air: Michael Crowley. 21 December 2016. Radio.

Evan Osnos, David Remnick, and Joshua Yaffa. "Trump, Putin, and The New Cold War." 6 March 2017. The New Yorker. Document. 18 April 2017.

VICE: Cold War 2.0. Dir. Shane Smith. Perf. Shane Smith and Simon Ostrovsky. 2015. TV Broadcast.